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This study aims to analyze the effects of the Brazilian National Supplementary 
Health Agency’s (NSHA) regulation on sticky costs of private healthcare providers 
(PHP). The research used financial and operational data from the NSHA analyzed 
through panel data regression and focused on PHP classified as medical cooperatives 
and group medicine between 2010 and 2018. The models developed employed 
different cost proxies (dependent variable) and explanatory variables. We verified 
that two cost proxies presented significant relations in all models: selling, general, 
and administrative expenses, and total cost. Concerning regulation variables, one was 
significant in the two studied modalities: PHP dependency ratio. This paper presents 
many contributions to different PHP’ stakeholders, such as NSHA, their managers, 
and Brazilian society. Among the main findings are (a) the importance of analyzing the 
organizations’ legal nature when examining sticky costs; (b) the proposal of different 
regulation variables to understand this phenomenon while displaying its importance 
in regulated industries; and (c) the relevance of employing different proxies when 
measuring sticky cost.  
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Este artigo apresenta os resultados de uma pesquisa que visou analisar efeitos da 
regulação da Agência Nacional de Saúde Suplementar (ANS) sobre o comportamento 
assimétrico dos custos em operadoras de planos de saúde (OPS) brasileiras. 
Especificamente, enfocaram-se as operadoras classificadas como cooperativas 
médicas e medicina de grupo entre os anos de 2010 e 2018. Os dados financeiros e 
operacionais empregados para o seu desenvolvimento foram secundários e coletados 
junto à ANS. A análise dos dados foi realizada por meio de regressão com dados em 
painel. Os modelos estimados consideraram diferentes proxies de custos (variável 
dependente) e variáveis explicativas. Verificou-se que duas proxies de custos tiveram 
relações significantes em todos os modelos estimados: despesas com vendas, 
gerais e administrativas, e custo total. No que se refere às variáveis de regulação, 
observou-se que uma delas foi considerada significante em ambas as modalidades: 
a razão de dependência das OPS. Esta pesquisa apresenta diversas contribuições 
aos diferentes stakeholders das OPS, tais como: a ANS, seus gestores e a sociedade. 
Podem ser citadas como inovações da pesquisa desenvolvida em relação aos estudos 
predecessores: (a) verificou-se a importância de se considerar a natureza jurídica 
das organizações, mesmo que pertencentes a um mesmo setor (proxy de estrutura de 
custos), para se analisar o fenômeno da assimetria de custos; (b) foram propostas 
diferentes variáveis regulatórias para compreender esse fenômeno, demonstrando 
sua relevância em setores bastante regulados; e (c) destacou-se a importância do uso 
de distintas proxies para se mensurar a assimetria de custos.
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The findings enable regulators to better understand the effects of rules on sticky 
costs of Brazilian private healthcare providers (PHP). PHP managers can implement 
more effective actions to continue essential services based on information about the 
variables related to sticky costs.
Practical Implications
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1 INTRODUCTION
Porporato and Werbin (2012) emphasize that traditional cost accounting is based on the assumption that 
costs vary proportionally according to the level of activities. Recent empirical research has shown that cost variation 
depends on the magnitude of changes in the level of activities and the direction of these changes (ascending or 
descending) (Porporato & Werbin, 2012; Shust & Weiss, 2014). These costs behavior contradicts the traditional 
model, and they are called sticky costs.
The seminal article by Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman (2003) established the empirical foundation 
for analyzing sticky costs. However, the authors focused only on selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) 
expenses as cost proxies. Subsequent studies have observed sticky costs based on other proxies (Pamplona, Fiirst, 
Silva, & Zonatto, 2016; Grejo, Abbas, Camacho, & Junqueira, 2019). Also, Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman 
(2003) limited their research to industrial companies, whereas subsequent literature expanded cost behavior 
analyses, examining other sectors (Subramaniam & Weidenmier, 2003; Holzhacker, Krishnan, & Mahlendorf, 
2015). Notwithstanding, an aspect that remains little addressed in the literature is the role of sectoral regulation on 
sticky costs, even though regulation significantly influences this phenomenon, as highlighted by Cook, Kieschnick, 
and Moussawi (2019).
Among the studies that examined this cost behavior from a regulation viewpoint are Porporato and 
Werbin (2012) and Holzhacker et al. (2015). For these authors, organizations subject to price regulation by external 
agencies tend to reduce sticky costs to mitigate operational risks. In Brazil, this is the case of private healthcare 
providers (PHP), which are closely regulated by the National Supplementary Health Agency (NSHA) (Varella 
& Ceschin, 2014). Among the NSHA classification of PHP, those classified as medical cooperatives and group 
medicine stand out. NSHA data (ANS, 2020) indicate that these two classes of PHP, together, are responsible for 
serving more than 35.6 million beneficiaries and sum 542 organizations operating in the country. A preliminary 
study by Avelar, Jordão, Boina, Santos, and Ferreira (2019a) suggested relationships between PHP sticky costs 
and the NSHA. However, the authors focused exclusively on one class of providers, failing to highlight the 
role of regulated prices – which seems relevant in this context. Thus, there is a theoretical gap on the effects of 
price regulation on the Brazilian PHP sticky cost, a relevant object of research given the essential role of these 
organizations in the national health system.
This study sought to answer the following research question: how does the National Supplementary 
Health Agency’s price regulation affect the private healthcare providers’ sticky costs? Therefore, we analyzed the 
effects of price regulation on the costs’ asymmetric behavior in Brazilian PHP (medical cooperatives and group 
medicine) between 2010 and 2018. The research adopted the following specific objectives, (a) to identify sticky 
costs in the two classes of PHP, (b) to observe accounting variables that influence such costs, and (c) to verify the 
effect of the NSHA’s regulation variables on the cost behavior of the PHP analyzed.
Studies that focus on Brazilian PHP sticky costs are relevant for many reasons. First, it is important 
to study this cost behavior in emerging economies, which present quite different characteristics compared to 
developed countries (where the phenomenon was initially reported) (Zonatto, Magro, Sant’Anna, & Padilha, 2018; 
Stimolo & Porporato, 2019). Second, PHP have a crucial role in the Brazilian national health system. The country’s 
supplementary health system has more than 73 million beneficiaries and almost 1,200 operating PHP, the main 
ones classified as medical cooperatives or group medicine (ANS, 2020). Third, the providers classified in these two 
categories have several characteristics in common. However, at the same time, these characteristics distinguish 
them from other PHP registered in the NSHA, which hinders comparability among all the PHP operating in 
the country (Resolução de Diretoria Colegiada n. 39, 2000; Guimarães & Nossa, 2010; Avelar, Souza, Amaral, 
& Reyes, 2019b). Fourth, studies focusing on the role of price regulation in the organizations’ sticky costs are 
important, particularly those in the health area (Holzhacker et al., 2019). Finally, this study expands the analysis 
developed by Avelar et al. (2019a) when considering the most relevant modalities of PHP in the country, focusing 
on the role of price regulation as a determinant of sticky costs, and gathering data from a period where the country 
faced different macroeconomic realities (growth, recession, and low growth) – which is a relevant variable for the 
analysis of sticky costs (Reis & Borgert, 2019).
The research counted on financial and operating data of PHP, obtained from the NSHA. Data were treated 
and analyzed using panel data regression. Costs of services were considered inadequate as a proxy for analyzing 
sticky costs in the proposed models. However, SG&A expenses, as well as total costs, were proxies that had 
significant relationships in all estimated models. Among the regulation variables, the PHP dependency ratio was 
considered significant for both classes of PHP. 
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Models involving providers classified as medical cooperatives presented more significant variables for 
sticky costs than group medicine. Findings contributing to enrich the literature are (i) the importance of analyzing 
the organizations’ legal nature when examining sticky costs; (ii) different regulation variables have been proposed 
to understand this phenomenon, demonstrating its relevance in highly regulated sectors; and (iii) the relevance 
of employing different proxies when measuring sticky costs, which is a procedure often ignored in the literature.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Sticky costs
Porporato and Werbin (2012) emphasize that knowledge about cost behavior is relevant to organizations’ 
management. The authors point out that the traditional approach to cost behavior assumes symmetric variation 
of costs in the face of changes in the organization’s level of activity. Thus, costs would change proportionally 
according to activity variation, regardless of direction (ascending or descending). In contrast to this symmetric 
behavior of costs, recent literature on the topic has focused on costs with asymmetric behavior or sticky costs.
Discussions about sticky costs emerged in response to criticism of traditional cost behavior (Malik, 2012). 
Grejo et al. (2019) clarify that, although the literature has already identified the emergence of sticky costs, the 
methodology proposed by Anderson et al. (2003) was the first offering evidence of asymmetric behavior of costs. 
The authors proposed a model in which the SG&A expenses were used as a proxy for costs (dependent variable), 
while the level of revenue as a proxy for the level of activity (independent variable). They found that when there 
was a drop in revenue, the cost was reduced to a lesser extent than increased, considering a proportional growth in 
revenue (Anderson et al., 2003). The authors referred to costs presenting this asymmetric behavior as sticky costs. 
The discussion on sticky costs led to an expansion in the literature, allowing a global understanding of 
this type of cost behavior. Some studies observed the phenomenon in developed economies, especially that of the 
United States and European nations, such as Calleja et al. (2006), Shust and Weiss (2014), Venieris, Naoum, and 
Vlismas (2015), Cook et al. (2019), Zhang, Yin, Han, and Aroskar (2019), and Hartlieb, Loy, and Eierle (2020). 
These authors analyzed companies and identified sticky costs, some focusing on specific sectors, while others 
including different determining variables. However, the level of asymmetry identified usually varied according to 
the country and the sector analyzed in each research.
As for companies located in emerging economies, studies are, in general, regionalized. Studies worth 
highlighting are Richartz, Borgert, and Lunkes (2014), Pamplona et al. (2016), Ferreira, Costa, and Ávila (2016), 
Zonatto et al. (2018), Stimolo and Porporato (2019), and Li, Ying, Chen, and Zhang (2020). In these studies, sticky 
costs were found at different levels and in different contexts, and the research focused on specific nations. The work 
by Pamplona et al. (2016) demonstrated that Brazilian companies presented less sticky costs than those in Chile 
and Mexico. Zonatto et al. (2018) studied the BRICS, finding variations in asymmetry levels when considering 
periods of economic growth or recession. Stimolo and Porporato (2019) examined Argentina, highlighting the 
importance of sticky costs in emerging economies. The authors pointed out that these countries have particular 
characteristics – which are different from those analyzed during the first models’ construction – and require studies 
prepared to consider such idiosyncrasies.
Several of the studies mentioned above have demonstrated asymmetric behavior in different cost proxies 
(not only in SG&A expenses), highlighting other explanatory variables of this phenomenon (Reis & Borgert, 2019; 
Grejo et al., 2019; Stimolo & Porporato, 2019; Hartlieb et al., 2020). However, variables linked to regulation are 
still little explored in the literature concerning sticky costs. Porporato and Werbin (2012) emphasize that market 
regulation is relevant to explain sticky costs. In addition, Holzhacker et al. (2015) explain that price regulation 
tends to include greater complexity in companies’ cost structure decisions, influencing sticky costs. That said, the 
private healthcare providers’ business is subject to intensively price regulation in Brazil, which means a fertile field 
of study to understand the relationship between sticky costs and regulation.
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2.2 Private healthcare providers (PHP) and the regulation of the National Supplementary Health Agency 
(NSHA)
A PHP is a legal entity, formed as a civil or commercial society, cooperative, or self-managed entity, 
which operates a product, service, or private health care plan contract (Law 9656/1998). Brazilian Law 9961 of 
2000 has played a crucial role in the PHP business by creating the National Supplementary Health Agency (NSHA) 
(in Portuguese, Agência Nacional de Saúde Suplementar – ANS). The agency resolution 39/2000 (Resolução de 
Diretoria Colegiada n. 39, 2000) classifies the PHP as administrator, self-management, medical cooperative, dental 
cooperative, philanthropic, group medicine, and group dentistry. Table 1 shows the number of beneficiaries and 
active providers by classification. PHP classified as administrators are not listed since, according to the NSHA 
resolution, they differ substantially from the others. These organizations are companies that administer healthcare 
plans without taking the risk related to these plans’ operations. 
NSHA Classification of PHP Number of beneficiaries Number of active PHP 
Self-management 4,319,557 160
Medical cooperative 17,282,146 283
Dental cooperative 3,373,873 103
Philanthropic 904,891 36
Group Medicine 18,346,069 259
Group Dentistry 12,951,918 181
Among the providers offering medical and hospital services, the PHP classified as medical cooperatives 
and group medicine prevail, both in the number of beneficiaries and active organizations. Also, these providers 
have accentuated differences from other classes. For example, self-management providers present particularities 
and work in specific niches (Avelar et al., 2019b), and philanthropic PHP are certified non-profit entities and 
enjoy tax exemptions (Resolução de Diretoria Colegiada n. 29, 2000). Finally, PHP offering dental healthcare are 
significantly distinct from the medical ones, a condition that undermines the joint analysis (Guimarães & Nossa, 
2010). Therefore, this study focused only on the providers classified as medical cooperatives and group medicine, 
considering their relevance and ensuring the results’ comparability.
2.3 Development of the hypotheses
As highlighted by Avelar et al. (2019a), Porporato and Werbin (2012), and Holzhacker et al. (2015), 
regulatory matters such as price regulation can interfere with the organizations’ cost behavior. For instance, 
Brazilian private healthcare providers (PHP) are strictly regulated by the NSHA, who control the prices charged 
and consequently influence sticky costs. Thus, based on the authors above, hypotheses regarding these norms were 
developed to guide this study.
Holzhacker et al. (2015) found changes in sticky costs in healthcare organizations after regulatory changes. 
This suggests that the same dynamic could apply to PHP, which has undergone several regulatory processes since 
the creation of NSHA. However, a legal measure (Direct Action of Unconstitutionality 1931/03) established that 
PHP contracted before the agency’s regulation (called in this study old plans) would not be subject to the rules, 
and the contract signed between the parties (providers and beneficiaries) prevail. Thus, as the PHP could adjust 
these plans’ prices following their business goals and market conditions – which reduce the effects of sticky costs 
measured based on the models that employ revenues as a proxy for the level of activities – Hypothesis 1 is:
H1: The greater proportion of old plans in the PHP portfolios tends to reduce the organizations’ sticky 
costs. 
Also, the adjustment of prices for individual healthcare plans is different from collective plans (contracted 
by companies and other organizations). According to Varella and Ceschin (2014), while individual plans can only 
be adjusted with the authorization of the NSHA, the collective can be adjusted based on the negotiation among the 
parties. Thus, it is expected that the PHP will have preferences for collective plans and, based on them, will be able 
to reflect the variations in their expenses in their prices, according to their interests. Again, there is a possibility of 
influencing revenues according to the organization’s needs. Therefore, based on Avelar et al. (2019a), Hypothesis 
2 is:
Source: Adapted from the National Supplementary Health Agency (ANS, 2020)
Table 1. Number of PHP beneficiaries and active organizations in 2020
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H2: The greater proportion of collective plans in the PHP portfolios reduces the organizations’ sticky 
costs.
Finally, the dependency ratio, i.e., “percentage ratio between the sum of the number of children under 15 
and those over 60, and beneficiaries between 15 and 59 years old” (ANS, 2016, p. 4), stands out. For the elderly, 
Kudlawicz, Steiner, and Frega (2015, p. 61) point out that normative resolution n. 63/03 (Resolução Normativa n. 
63, 2003) caused the readjustment of health plans for the group over 60 to be restricted to a fixed amount in relation 
to the first age group. This implied a reduction in PHP revenues due to the prohibition on increasing monthly fees 
and leveraging costs for the last age group (which tends to use more services). Considering that, contrary to the 
previous hypotheses, there is a reduced legal margin to influence revenues for the benefit of providers, Hypothesis 
3 was developed based on Avelar et al. (2019a):
H3: Highest dependency ratio in the PHP portfolios leads to an increase in the organizations’ sticky costs.
3 METHODOLOGY
The first step in developing this study consisted of a search for articles on sticky costs in the databases 
of the Brazilian Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (Capes) – Science Direct and 
Scopus. We selected articles according to relevance following the databases criteria and identified those offering 
empirical, theoretical, and methodological contributions to the topic. In addition, databases gathering articles 
produced in Latin America were consulted to consolidate a regional character. We selected articles from Scielo, 
Redalyc, and Google Scholar, observing the studies’ relevance and contribution. Thus, articles that contributed to 
the development of the theme of sticky cost were selected in both developed and emerging economies, with a focus 
on Latin America and Brazil.
The population examined was Brazilian private healthcare providers (PHP), and the sample comprised 
the PHP classified by the National Supplementary Health Agency (NSHA) as medical cooperatives and group 
medicine. The study used secondary data collected from the NSHA website, referring to 2010-2018 (ANS, 2006). 
The year 2010 was chosen because it was the year Brazil adhered to the international accounting standards (Gelbcke, 
Santos, Iudícibus, & Martins, 2018). The option to limit the sample to PHP classified as medical cooperatives and 
group medicine was due to their characteristics, as explained in subsection 2.2. Table 2 shows the number of PHP 
in the sample (per class and year).
Classes of PHP 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Group medicine 333 307 241 221 212 213 209 204 203
Medical cooperatives 327 320 309 301 294 288 294 288 271
Total 660 627 550 522 506 501 503 492 474
Financial data was obtained from the providers’ annual financial statements, and operational data was 
gathered from the NSHA’s website by request supported on the Brazilian freedom of information law (Law 
12527/2011).
The data were analyzed using panel data regression, widely used in studies on sticky costs since the 
seminal study by Anderson et al. (2003). Three models were estimated for each class of PHP, and three different 
cost proxies were used, following the works by Pamplona et al. (2016), Zonatto et al. (2018), Avelar et al. (2019a), 
Reis and Borgert (2019): costs of rendered services, selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses, and 
total cost.
The first estimated model was based on the original study by Anderson et al. (2003), aiming to identify the 
providers’ sticky costs (Equation 1). For all models presented below, (a) cost means the different proxies of costs 
mentioned above, (b) REV is the providers’ net sales revenue, and (c) Red is the multiplier reduction, which is a 
dummy variable (1 is applied when there is a decrease in revenues between the periods, and 0 otherwise). Also, 
α, β, i, t, and μ represent, respectively, the intercept, the coefficients, the organization, the period, and the error.
Source: Elaborated by the authors
Table 2. Number of PHP in the sample, per year, per classification
(1)
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The models were estimated to verify the influence of accounting variables on the sticky costs, based on 
the studies by Richartz and Borgert (2016) and Reis and Borgert (2019). Not all variables cited by those authors 
were used, either because they are variables exogenous to the providers or because they demand information from 
the capital market (unavailable to the vast majority of PHP). Equation 2 presents the model.
Where:
AVAI is the available asset;
FIX is the fixed asset (property and equipment);
TPC is the third party capital used; and
TAS is the total asset.
Finally, models related to NSHA regulation on the PHP’s sticky costs were estimated. Based on legislation 
on healthcare providers and the study by Avelar et al. (2019a), three variables with the potential to influence 
costs with asymmetric behavior were selected: the proportion of old plans in the providers’ portfolios, proportion 
of collective plans in their portfolios, and the providers’ dependency ratio. The possibility of a PHP owning a 
hospital was also considered. Chart 1 shows the operationalization of the variables related to regulation. Equation 
3 presents the model.
Hypothesis Variable Acronym in the model Calculation Reference 
H1
Proportion of old 
plans in the providers’ 
portfolios
OLD Number of old plan beneficiaries ÷ Total number of beneficiaries NSHA (ANS, 2018a)
H2
Proportion of collective 
plans in the providers’ 
portfolios
COL
Number of beneficiaries of 






Number of beneficiaries under 15 
over 60 ÷ Number of beneficiaries 
over 15 and under 60 
NSHA (ANS, 2016)
Tests were used to select the best-estimated model: (a) Chow test, to choose between the fixed effects 
model or pooled ordinary least squares; (b) Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test, to choose between the random 
effects model or pooled ordinary least squares; and (c) Hausman test to choose between the random effects or fixed 
effects model (Gujarati & Porter, 2011; Fávero, 2015). Other tests were applied after estimating the models to 
assess the compliance with assumptions and adequacy criteria: F/Wald test, variance inflation factor, Wooldridge 
test, and modified Wald test (Gujarati & Porter, 2011; Fávero, 2015). Figure 1 summarizes the methodological 
procedures.
Chart 1. Operationalization of variables related to regulation
Source: Elaborated by the authors
(2)
(3)
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4 RESULTS 
The results obtained when applying the original model by Anderson et al. (2003) (Equation 1) are 
described in Table 3. There was no significance observed for any variable in any of the providers’ classes when 
adopting the dependent variable cost of rendered services. On the other hand, the variables related to revenue were 
significant for the models of SG&A expenses and total costs in both classes of PHP. Table 3 also shows that sticky 
costs only occur when the variable SG&A expenses were used as a cost proxy in the case of medical cooperatives. 
Sticky costs were not evident for group medicine providers.
Table 4 shows the results obtained for each PHP classes based on the model with accounting variables 
(Equation 2). Again, no significant relationship of their independent variables was found when the proxy was 
the costs of rendered services. On the other hand, two variables revealed sticky costs – earnings available and 
fixed assets – since they presented significant relationships in both remaining models estimated for the medical 
cooperatives. The asymmetric behavior of costs, when observing the total costs variable, can be considered sticky. 
In contrast, anti-sticky behavior was observed for the dependent variable SG&A expenses. PHP classified as group 
medicine did not show sticky behavior in this model.
Finally, Table 5 presents the results for the models that considered the regulation variables (Equation 3). 
None of the variables in the models that used the dependent variable cost of rendered services were considered 
significant. As observed in the previous models, when using the variables SG&A expenses and total costs as 
proxies, significant results were obtained regarding revenues and, in some cases, there is evidence of sticky costs.
Considering the dependent variable total costs, the estimated model for medical cooperatives revealed 
sticky cost – with a contribution from the variable dependency ratio. On the other hand, when considering the 
variable SG&A expenses as proxy costs in the providers classified as group medicine, the variable dependency 
ratio demonstrated an anti-sticky asymmetric behavior. It should be noted that the other regulation variables were 
not considered significant in the estimated models. From the results, it was possible to confirm hypothesis 3, that 
the highest dependency ratio in the providers’ portfolios increases the occurrence of sticky costs. However, it 
was not possible to confirm hypotheses 1 and 2, which assumed the relationship between the sticky costs and the 
variables proportion of old plans and proportion of collective plans in the providers’ portfolio. Chart 2 summarizes 
the results regarding the hypotheses.
 
 
Figure 1. Synthesis of the methodological procedures
Source: Elaborated by the authors
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Classification Medical cooperatives Group medicine
Dependent variable Cost of rendered services
Selling, general, and 
administrative expenses Total costs
Cost of rendered 
services
Selling, general, and 
administrative expenses Total costs
Model Fixed effects Random effects Pooled ordinary least squares
Pooled ordinary least 
squares Fixed effects Fixed effects
Log of revenue variation 258321.50 0.47*** 0.31*** 2701.28 0.35*** 0.46***
Dummy of revenue reduction -6903.12 -0.03*** -0,00 -374.85 0.02 0.02
Intercept -248114.90 -0.48*** -0.29*** -2094.19 -0.37*** -0.46***
Chow test 5.43*** 0.86 1.07 0.70 2.16*** 1.95***
Lagrange multiplier  0.00 8.73*** 0.20 0.00 0.32 0.06
Hausman test 0.43 1.70 7.37 1.83 9.14*** 10.21***
Wald and F test 0.50 140.84*** 29.55*** 2.12 9.65*** 10.14***
Variance inflation factor 1.78 1.78 1.78 1.67 1.67 1.67
Wooldridge test 29.01*** 428.55*** 8902.38*** 1.415e+07*** 147.171*** 3397.52***
Modified Wald test 1.5e+40*** 3.9e+36*** 1.9e+34*** 1.7e+41*** 1.2e+36*** 2.7e+36***
Table 3. Results – Original model
Source: Elaborated by the authors
Note: *Significance of less than 10%; ** significance of less than 5%; *** significance of less than 1%
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Classification Medical cooperatives Group medicine
Dependent variable Cost of rendered services
Selling, general, and 
administrative expenses Total costs
Cost of rendered 
services
Selling, general, and 
administrative expenses Total costs
Model Fixed effects Random effects Pooled ordinary least squares
Pooled ordinary least 
squares Fixed effects Fixed effects
Log of revenue variation 342928.90 0.38*** 0.40*** 3437.49 0.39*** 0.42***
Dummy of revenue reduction -164846.90 0.17* -0.25* -2344.79 -0.08 0.10
Log of earnings availablea 3862.38 -0.04*** -0.01 -11.05 0.01 -0.01
Log of fixed assetsa 41253.01 0.03* 0.02 -7.48 -0.06 -0.07
Log of third parties capitala 855815.30 0.05 -0.01 -93.72 0.00 -0.13
Log of asseta 60287.20 -0.03** 0.03* 269.31 0.01 -0.03
Dummy of owning a hospital 104178.30 0.01 0.04 -66.30 0.02 0.03
Intercept -340735.50 -0.38*** -0.39*** -2927.62 -0.43*** -0.43
Chow test 5.57*** 0.90 1.04 0.71 2.08*** 1.89***
Lagrange multiplier  0.00 7.06*** 1.24 0.00 1.05 1.37
Hausman test 18.87*** 19.70*** 17.50** 7.43 32.12*** 41.58***
Wald and F test 0.15 157.93*** 77.55*** 2.67 3.53*** 4.06***
Variance inflation factor 23.66 23.66 23.66 14.45 14.45 14.45
Wooldridge test 14.31*** 461.48*** 7491.05*** 7.826e+06*** 151.75*** 3704.11***
Modified Wald test 5.7e+38*** 1.1e+33*** 4.6e+34*** 2.7e+40*** 1.8e+36*** 6.1e+35***
Table 4. Results – Accounting variables
Source: Elaborated by the authors
Note: *Significance of less than 10%; ** significance of less than 5%; *** significance of less than 1%; a values multiplied by the dummy of revenue reduction.
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Classification Medical cooperatives Group medicine
Dependent variable Cost of rendered services
Selling, general, and 
administrative expenses Total costs
Cost of rendered 
services
Selling, general, and 
administrative expenses Total costs
Model Fixed effects Random effects Pooled ordinary least squares
Pooled ordinary least 
squares Fixed effects Fixed effects
Log of revenue variation 284344.10 0.47*** 0.32*** 2741.90 0.37*** 0.47***
Dummy of revenue reduction -115668.20 -0.01 -0.05*** -431.03 0.06 0.04
Log of proportion of collective 
plansa -103677.30 0.02 -0.05 -110.54 0.04 -0.04
Log of proportion of old plansa -48367.08 0.31 0.15 55.01 -0.01 0.08
Log of dependence ratioa -239557.50 0.02 -0.14*** -130.96 0.14** 0.09
Dummy of owning a hospital 11318.99 0.01 0.02 -4.28 0.05 0.04
Intercept -276460.10 -0.49 -0.31*** -2140.17 -0.36 -0.48***
Chow test 5.45*** 0.87 1.05 0.70 2.09*** 1.91***
Lagrange multiplier  0.00 8.25*** 0.54 0.00 0.49 0.07
Hausman test 10.19 7.86 9.49 5.56 19.28*** 11.55**
Wald and F test 0.18 178.78*** 109.52*** 2.26 4.02*** 4.13***
Variance inflation factor 2.30 2.30 2.30 1.74 1.74 1.74
Wooldridge test 0.043*** 443.347*** 7954.52*** 1.237e+07*** 147.64*** 3213.84***
Modified Wald test 5.4e+38*** 1.0e+34*** 4.6e+34*** 1.2e+40*** 5.4e+35*** 4.1e+36***
Hypothesis
Medical cooperatives Group medicine
Cost of rendered 
services
Selling, general, and 
administrative expenses Total costs
Cost of rendered 
services
Selling, general, and 
administrative expenses Total costs
H1 Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected
H2 Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected
H3 Rejected Rejected Confirmed Rejected Confirmed Rejected
Table 5. Results – Regulation variables
Source: Elaborated by the authors
Note: *Significance of less than 10%; ** significance of less than 5%; *** significance of less than 1%; a values multiplied by the dummy of revenue reduction.
Chart 2. Hypotheses
Source: Elaborated by the authors
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5 DISCUSSION
The models using the cost of rendered services as costs proxy did not present any significant variables, 
which is a result that contradicts the expectations based on the model by Anderson et al. (2003) and the studies 
by Avelar et al. (2019a), Holzhacker et al. (2014), and Richartz and Borgert (2016). Therefore, this proxy was not 
suitable to analyze sticky costs in the models applied to Brazilian private healthcare providers (PHP). This result 
confirms Shust and Weiss’ (2014) findings on how the choice of proxies can influence the measurement of sticky 
costs through different statistical models. It is also aligned with findings by Zonatto et al. (2018), who showed the 
significance of models that used this same proxy in Brazilian companies.
On the other hand, the fact that the variables related to revenues are significant in the models where 
selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses and total costs were used as cost proxies in both classes 
of PHP suggests a positive relationship between these proxies and revenue, which is aligned with findings of 
Porporato and Werbin (2012). Sticky costs were only observed in medical cooperatives, confirming the results 
of Avelar et al. (2019a). In this case, it appears that even when operating in the same sector, organizations with 
different legal nature may or may not present sticky costs.
The model with accounting variables estimated for medical cooperatives identified the contribution of 
the organization’s earnings available and fixed assets to sticky costs. This result confirms that obtained in Grejo 
et al. (2019) and Richartz and Borgert (2016) and, partially, the health sector findings by Avelar et al. (2019a) and 
Holzhacker et al. (2014). There was anti-sticky cost behavior when the cost proxy was the total cost, contrary to 
what was observed in Avelar et al. (2019a).
Finally, the results regarding the regulation variable providers’ dependency ratio showed different sticky 
costs depending on the classification of the PHP and the cost proxy used, demonstrating the complexity of this 
asymmetry. This phenomenon seems to be sensitive to the legal nature of organizations, which is a variable that 
is not usually present in national or international studies. Usually, such studies focus on the sector (cost structure 
proxy) as a way to obtain evidence of sticky cost, as observed in the studies by Carmo and Xavier (2016), Santos 
et al. (2017), Stimolo and Porporato (2019), and Zhang et al. (2019). However, this research demonstrated that 
sticky cost could differ significantly among organizations in the same sector; in this case, Brazilian supplementary 
healthcare. Thus, the use of different models to analyze organizations of distinct legal nature can capture such 
heterogeneity.
6 CONCLUSION
The research results show the unsuitability of costs of rendered services as a proxy to analyze sticky 
costs in the proposed models. Other proxies such as SG&A expenses and total costs demonstrated significant 
relationships in all estimated models, as expected based on the literature. In these cases, significant results were 
found regarding the level of revenue (a proxy for the level of activity). Also, when estimating the original model 
by Anderson et al. (2003), sticky costs were found only for medical cooperatives. When other accounting variables 
were inserted in the models, some of them presented significant relationships, indicating their effects on medical 
cooperatives' sticky costs. As for PHP classified as group medicine, none of these variables were significant.
For the regulation variables, providers’ dependency ratio was considered significant in both classes of 
PHP. The effect on sticky costs was expected, considering that this measure indicates a lower margin for price 
management (and consequently lower revenue). However, the hypotheses related to greater flexibility in price 
management – considering the variables related to the proportion of old and collective plans in the providers’ 
portfolios and their relationship with sticky costs – were rejected. The smaller number of variables contributing 
to the PHP’s sticky costs compared to companies in other sectors can be related to the healthcare providers’ lean 
structure in the face of an uncertain environment, with limited management mechanisms in a regulated context, as 
highlighted by Holzhacker et al. (2015).
The findings obtained in this study contribute to improving the work of different stakeholders in the 
sector of supplementary health. First, the National Supplementary Health Agency has evidence that regulation 
may affect the sticky cost of the PHP in different ways. Several variables are involved in the phenomenon of costs 
asymmetric behavior, and regulation must consider the organizations’ sticky costs to avoid measures that can harm 
their economic-financial sustainability. From the perspective of the PHP managers, the awareness that different 
variables influence sticky costs enables them to make informed decisions and reduce the risks associated with such 
asymmetry. Finally, society as a whole can benefit from these findings since they lead to better management and 
regulation in the supplementary health sector, which serves tens of millions of Brazilians (ANS, 2020).
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This study innovated by noting the importance of the organizations’ legal nature, even within a single 
sector, when exploring the phenomenon of sticky costs, which is something previous studies did not consider. 
Different regulation variables were also proposed to understand the asymmetric behavior of costs, exploring their 
influence in highly regulated sectors. The study particularly revealed the different effects of a regulation variable 
related to prices on the different classes of PHP, demonstrating the relevance of the variable for decision-making. 
Finally, the importance of using different proxies to measure sticky costs was highlighted, a condition often 
ignored in research. Despite the innovation and advances, the study also presented limitations. First, the sample 
was relatively small in terms of available data, and because only two classes of PHP were investigated. Second, 
the limitation of available data led to a reduced number of regulation variables.
Future research could test the same or other regulation variables linked to prices in PHP classified as 
self-management, philanthropic, dental cooperative, or group dentistry, or in other time horizons, overcoming 
the limitations of this endeavor. Finally, further research is needed to capture the point of view of regulators and 
managers and better understand the effects of their decisions on sticky costs.
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